JSOC and Rivalry Between the Armed Forces and the Police

By Made Supriatma for Geotimes.id

May 18, 2018

The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Indonesia has been reactivated by President Joko Widodo, with a mandate to support the police in the fight against terrorism. Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto, the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), has officially inaugurated JSOC. The  command comprises elite units from the Indonesian National Armed Forces, including the Army’s special forces counter-terrorism unit (Gultor 81), the Navy’s counter-terrorism special operations unit (Denjaka), and the Air Force’s Detachment B (Den Bravo).

The specific operational arrangements between JSOC and the Indonesian National Police, as well as the division of responsibilities and areas of involvement, remain undisclosed. However, beyond these technical details, we should address a more fundamental question: Is JSOC really necessary for countering terrorism?

I, for one, question the need for JSOC’s involvement. My reasoning is straightforward. The armed forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are primarily trained for combat operations to defend the nation’s territorial integrity. Their training focuses on offensive tactics, assaults, and territorial occupation. Conversely, effectively countering terrorism places a more significant emphasis on intelligence, investigation, and security strategy, rather than direct combat. This demands expertise in policing and intelligence, particularly specialized intelligence capable of monitoring terrorist group communications and their support infrastructure.

Can military intelligence offer assistance? Certainly, but military intelligence should primarily focus on strategic intelligence, safeguarding the nation from external threats. This sphere is already vast, covering the interception of external threats like submarines entering national waters, transit of foreign aircraft, and strategic military movements of other nations, among other aspects. Information from this domain may indeed be shared for counter-terrorism purposes. In general, the role of military intelligence extends far beyond counter-terrorism intelligence.

Nonetheless, due to other factors, I reluctantly endorse JSOC’s involvement in counter-terrorism efforts.

This is my rationale.

Research into the 2002 unrest in Ambon revealed a longstanding issue between the Police and the Armed Forces, particularly the Army. This on-the-ground conflict was further exacerbated by competition between the two. The Police were often perceived as pro-Christian, while the Army was viewed as pro-Muslim. Although this perception did not always align with the actual circumstances, it still influenced public perception, particularly at the local level.

This perception persists, albeit less intensely than in Ambon. Rivalry between these institutions is evident in various areas of horizontal conflict, as identified by numerous studies of these conflicts. This institutional rivalry often exacerbates the situation.

As terrorism gained prominence, and the police were granted authority and external funding for prosecution, the perception that the police were conducting a war against Islam became more pronounced. This perception was further inflamed by campaigns conducted by some civilian politicians to score short-term political points.

Terrorist groups themselves contributed to reinforcing this perception. In recent years, terrorists have targeted the police. The “Police versus Islam” campaign, supported by both political parties and civilian social organizations, continued to gain momentum.

Simultaneously, rivalry between the police and the armed forces persisted, with clashes occurring in various locations, often seen as inevitable. This rivalry even seeped into counter-terrorism efforts, leaving the armed forces feeling sidelined.

In recent years, the armed forces appeared to align more closely with Islamic groups. The Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces actively supported Islamic groups. During the massive 212 coalition movement demonstration, he visibly expressed strong sympathy for the event. It is now well known that he has political ambitions to run for president in 2019.

However, the deeply ingrained perception that the police oppose Islam and the armed forces are pro-Islam remains. Some might argue that this perception is politically correct and therefore should not be acknowledged. But if we are honest, detecting its presence isn’t a difficult task. In my view, discussing this openly and seeking solutions is preferable to hiding the problem and eventually suffering the consequences.

So, these are the critical points. The perception that the police are anti-Islam must be dispelled. The police’s work in countering terrorism benefits the entire nation. The involvement of the armed forces is unwarranted, not because they are pro-Islam, but because it is beyond their mandate.

Unfortunately, the damage is already done, and the campaign to reinforce this perception continues. Institutional rivalry between the police and the armed forces has been exploited and politicized by civilian politicians, ultimately benefiting terrorists and their supporters by providing ‘cover’ for the spread of their ideology.

This is a profound and serious problem for the nation. It is a fundamental issue that threatens the nation’s existence. Politicians, military leaders, senior police officers, and even some academics overlook this for their short-term interests, namely retaining power.

That is why, in my opinion, albeit reluctantly, JSOC’s involvement is necessary. Not because the armed forces possess the expertise, and not because they must be present, but because the police institution requires legitimacy to carry out its mission. JSOC’s presence will provide this essential legitimacy and remove the stigma that counter-terrorism efforts are anti-Islam.

Nevertheless, there will always be those who exploit the anti-Islam issue. Marginal groups will loudly proclaim their stance in the name of Islam, as if they represent the silent majority. They have a platform. Politicians who can exploit the issue for their political interests. Media hungry for ratings will provide a platform as well because controversy boosts viewership, advertising, and ultimately revenue.

Returning to JSOC, I believe there must be limitations on its scope. The most critical restriction should be that JSOC should not include the army’s territorial commands (especially the Army). Countering terrorism should not devolve into a territorial task for the army, involving surveillance of civilian life, as occurred during the New Order regime.

In conclusion, the fight against terrorism is the nation’s responsibility, shared by all institutions. The President must carefully coordinate these institutions, minimizing rivalry between these two crucial entities. Civilian politicians should not exploit differences for short-term political gains, and the same applies to military and police leaders. They must prioritize the nation’s interests over party, group, and personal interests.

It might sound cliché, but it is what we need now.

Koopsusgab dan Rivalitas TNI-Polri

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