Opinion: TNI and Polri: National Institutions or Political Instruments, Tempo
January 14, 2025 By Ikhsan Yosarie for Tempo.co
The political year serves as a real test for the implementation of security sector reforms, both for Polri and TNI. The year 2024 offers the closest experience for analyzing this phenomenon, given the two episodes of democratic contest: the presidential election conducted in February 2024, followed by provincial and regional elections held nation wide in November 2024.
In both episodes, the term “brown party” (partai coklat or parcok) was directed at Polri. The term emerged in various public discourses as police officers were suspected of involvement in supporting particular candidates, a concern raised by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and discussed on Tempo Magazines popular podcast Bocor Alus Politik.
The presidential and regional elections became arenas where the interests of two sides intersected—politicians or political contenders, and interventionist officers (to borrow Eric A. Nordlinger’s 1990 term) from state institutions. In national political contests, especially for incumbents, leveraging state power is a tempting vulnerability.
Various episodes of Bocor Alus Politik that covered these democratic contests elaborated on the alleged use of government institutions to secure electoral victories, including details of their areas of mobilization.
Using government institutions is considered effective for securing electoral wins. These institutions possess a territorial system that extends all the way down to the village level, even down to neighborhood units, allowing them to precisely map a candidate’s level of popularity. And their authority can be wielded to suppress alternative political choices in certain areas by reactivating dormant legal cases.
At the same time, the political aspirations of contestants align with the ambitions of particular officials, particularly concerning rank and promotion. This convergence of interests fosters a mutually beneficial symbiosis for both parties while regressing democracy.
The intersection of interests places the government institutions in a dual role—with one foot as a political instrument, and the other as representative of a government or state institution. Although these bodies remain state institutions formally and legally, it becomes difficult to see them functioning as such in practice during political contests, as analyzed by the folk at Bocor Alus Politik.
The roles of government or state institutions and political instruments are fundamentally unequal. During the authoritarian US-backed New Order regime between 1966 and 1998, when the military upheld the regime, former Commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) Soemitro described this condition as a demotion of the Indonesian Armed Forces (then known as ABRI) from a state apparatus to a political instrument, Salim Said wrote in 2006.
In studies of military and political relations, such symptoms create an open space for military involvement in politics. Nordlinger (1990) explains that interventionist military officers intervene to protect military interests.
According to Samuel Decalo, as cited by Ulf Sundhaussen (1988), weak political systems, structural fragility in state institutions, and elite civilian conflicts within government also invite military involvement. Sundhaussen further explains that such interference arises when officers assume pivotal political leadership roles and exploit opportunities to engage in politics.
Adopting insights from these studies of military and politics helps explain the involvement of state or government institutions (TNI and Polri) in democratic contests, including the 2024 elections. Nordlinger’s concept of interventionist officers can be examined by analyzing fundamental convergences and divergences of interests.
In the context of convergence, involvement serves to uphold shared interests. During the New Order regime, shared interests ensured regime continuity while ABRI retained extensive privileges and authority.
In contrast, divergent interests manifest when involvement seeks to secure benefits for officers in exchange for their political support. This could include safeguarding large institutional budgets or maintaining institutional structures in state governance. Officers, fearing their interests will be marginalized under a new regime, may take action to protect them.
Decalo’s explanation highlights conditions such as weak oversight, a lack of sanctions, politicization of state institutions, and under-performance of local political party machinery, prompting interventionist officers to leverage territorial structures for political purposes.
In the context of the 2024 elections, allegations of government institutions involvement raised by various parties should prompt election administrators, monitors, and the police to investigate rather than passively await evidence or reports.
Officer-driven political orientations often stem directly from ambitions related to rank and position, both within state institutions and post-retirement. These ambitions are linked to political aspirations, interpreted as efforts to secure future political careers. Consequently, officers may invest politically early on by supporting candidates perceived as promising.
This dynamic is evident in the political positions and appointments of retired military or police officers as ministers, state-owned enterprise commissioners, and party officials, which reflect their political affiliations. Presidential and regional elections thus become avenues linking political ambitions with politicians’ needs.
The involvement of state apparatus (TNI/Polri) in political contests not only harms democracy but also disrupts internal institutional dynamics, leading to division, rivalry, and compromised professionalism. Political engagement fosters factionalism within state institutions, driven by rank-based political loyalty.
Provisions in Law No. 34 of 2004 on the TNI and Law No. 2/2002 on Polri remain unenforced. Political ambitions overshadow legal mandates, sidelining their core roles as defenders and enforcers of state security in favor of political pursuits.
The detrimental precedent of the New Order on democracy and institutional professionalism should not be repeated. Civilian oversight must underpin security sector reforms alongside regulatory frameworks for TNI and Polri. Without mutual commitment between the government and TNI/Polri leadership, reform progress will remain tenuous.
Encouraging neutrality and political disengagement for national institutions is critical, but the responsibility also lies with the government and civilian politicians to avoid drawing TNI/Polri into political agendas, thereby respecting their professional integrity.
This article is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/tni-dan-polri-sebagai-alat-kekuasaan-1193684.
In earlier news…
Indonesia’s Army Chief of Staff Advocates Allowing Defense Members To Engage in Business
By Aryo Putranto Saptohutomo for Kompas.com, July 23, 2024
JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com – Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army (KSAD) General Maruli Simanjuntak has suggested that members of the Indonesian defense force should be allowed to engage in business activities under certain restrictions set out by law. The proposal comes amid discussions over revision of Law 34/2004 On the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI).
“If we can create a framework for this, we should go ahead. But if the law says it’s not allowed, then we won’t do it,” Gen. Maruli said at Army Headquarters in Jakarta on Monday, July 22, 2024, as quoted from Kompas TV’s YouTube channel. Gen. Maruli also emphasized that he would not insist on the idea if the law continues to prohibit defense force members from engaging in business.
“My suggestion is just to outline clear boundaries and regulations so that defense force members can still be allowed to engage in business. If the law prohibits it, we will comply. If the law says no, then no, and we will continue with our duties,” Gen. Maruli said.
Previously, the Indonesian National Armed Forces has proposed that active-duty members be permitted to engage in business activities through a revision of Law No. 34/2004 which regulates the national defense force. Article 39(c) of the law presently prohibits active-duty officers from engaging in business activities. So the National Armed Forces has proposed that this article be removed. Rear Admiral Kresno Buntoro, Head of the Indonesian Armed Forces Law Reform Agency, argued that it is the Armed Forces as an institution, and not the individual officers, that should be prohibited from engaging in business activities.
“We suggest removing Article 39(c) of the law. It should be the institution of the Indonesian Armed Forces that is prohibited from operating businesses, not individual soldiers. If a soldier wants to open a small shop, they should be allowed to,” Rear Admiral Kresno said at a public hearing on the current Armed Forces/Police reform Bill. The hearing was organized by the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs and was held at Hotel Borobudur in Central Jakarta on Thursday, July 11, 2024, as quoted from the YouTube channel of the Coordinating Ministry.
This article is based on https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/07/23/18022501/ksad-tetap-berharap-anggota-tni-diizinkan-berbisnis
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