Part IV
Competition Among the Generals Behind 1998 Kidnappings and Riots
By M. Ahsan Ridhoi and the Tirto.co Team, February 25, 2020
Joko Widodo embraced the retired generals who in the past have competed fiercely with each other to win military and political positions.
Ten days before the 2019 presidential election, an amateur video circulated on social media. Retired two-star general, Kivlan Zen, supporting presidential candidate Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Prabowo Subianto, is in a heated exchange with retired four-star General (Retd.) Wiranto, who is defending the incumbent President Joko Widodo. With a raised tone, Kivlan says to Wiranto, “I’m not accusing, I’m saying you, Brother (Wiranto), you should take responsibility, not be a puppet. You were the Commander (of the armed forces in 1998).”
In this statement, Kivlan is referring to the kidnapping of activists, and the 1998 riots that rocked Jakarta, historically attributed to Prabowo Subianto, a former Commander of the Armed Forces Special Forces Command (Kopassus) and former Commander of the Armed Forces Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), who was dismissed from military service when Wiranto led the Indonesian Armed Forces, or ABRI, the name for the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI today) was known by at that time.
On March 28, 2019, in a public discussion in the Central Java city of Solo titled ‘The History of 1998’, Kivlan proposed that the generals from 1998 disclose information about the kidnapping of the activists. A month earlier, Kivlan had accused Wiranto of orchestrating the riots, being responsible for the abduction of the activists, and contributing to the removal of President Soeharto.
Wiranto responded to Kivlan’s statement in February 2019 with a challenge to a take a solemn oath. “I dare to say,” said Wiranto at the Presidential Palace, “dare to take a blood oath (sumpah pocong).” “Which one among us, Prabowo, Kivlan Zen, or me, was the mastermind behind the 1998 riots?”
Wiranto claimed that he had successfully “secured” the country on May 13-15, 1998. “On May 13, the Trisakti University shooting took place. There were riots in Jakarta during the day. The riots peaked on May 14. That night, I deployed forces from East Java to enter Jakarta, so by the morning of May 15 Jakarta was safe, and the national situation was secure,” said Wiranto, who is now chairman of the board of advisors in the re-election campaign team of President Joko Widodo who is seeking a second term.
Prabowo’s Defence – 1998 Activist Kidnappings Were An Intelligence Operation
Long before the verbal clash between Kivlan and Wiranto about the events of May 1998, Prabowo had already defended himself. In an interview with Panji Magazine on October 27, 1999, Prabowo said that Wiranto should have known the situation at the time.
“He knew there was an order for an investigation. As soon as he became the commander of ABRI, I reported that there was an intelligence operation (sandi yudha).” According to Prabowo, the names of the activists from the People’s Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik or PRD) who were abducted by the Rose Team (Tim Mawar), a task force inside the Special Forces Command group which he led, were provided by the police following an explosion at the Tanah Tinggi flats in Central Jakarta.
The explosion occurred in a unit occupied by several PRD members on January 18, 1998. The event was considered by senior military figures in the New Order regime the most serious threat to disrupt the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) General Session in March 1998. (At the time, it was the consititutional task of the MPR to elect the nation’s President and Vice President.)
The Rose Team abducted six PRD activists—Aan Rusdianto, Andi Arief, Faisol Riza, Mugiyanto, Nezar Patria, and Raharja Waluyo Jati—and held them at Special Forces Command HQ at Cijantung outside Jakarta, between February and March 1998.
Regarding the other three names—Desmond J. Mahesa, Haryanto Taslam, and Pius Lustrilanang—Prabowo called it an “accident”, and said, “I never ordered their capture.” “That they were detained longer, led to it being called a kidnapping,” Prabowo told Panji Magazine. “I consider it a technical error.” Prabowo said, “To my recollection, President Soeharto himself has admitted to several ministers that it was an intelligence operation. Within ABRI, this has become common knowledge.”
1998 Jakarta Riots
As for the riots on May 13-15, 1998, in Jakarta, speaking to journalist Jose Manuel Tesoro of Asiaweek on March 3, 2000, Prabowo denied being the mastermind. “What would have been our (my) motivation for orchestrating the riots?”
“Our interest was to maintain power. I was part of the Soeharto regime. If Mr. Soeharto had lasted three more years, I might have become a four-star general. Why should I burn the capital? That would have gone against my interests…”
Prabowo’s denial was reinforced by the statement of the Commander of the greater Jakarta territorial military command (Kodam Jaya) at that time, Major General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, in an Asiaweek report. He denied that Prabowo controlled him during the riots on May 13-15, 1998. “He (Prabowo) is my friend, but I had to adhere to my chain of tasking procedures,” said Sjafrie. The procedures referred to by Sjafrie relate to Operation Mantap (Steadfast).
This was an ongoing operation conducted from March 25, 1996 to June 30, 1998 to secure the 1997 elections and the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) General Session in 1998. (Aimed at re-electing President Soeharto.)
In the 2006 investigation document by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) into the cases of forced disappearances, the operation’s commanders were named as ABRI Commander General Feisal Tanjung (May 1993-February 1998) and National Police Chief General Dibyo Widodo (March 1996-June 1998).
Military Operation and Leadership Dynamics in Indonesia: A Prelude to the 1998 Kidnappings and Riots
The operation was conducted nationwide in Indonesia, with Greater Jakarta Military District Commander Lt. Gen. Sjafrie acting as (overall) operation command commander (Pangkoops) and Greater Metro Jakarta Police Chief Major General Hamami Nata as his deputy. At the time, the police took control of “security and civil order,” so the police implemented Operation Mantap Brata to implement Operation Mantap. Specifically, if the situation became uncontrollable, command authority would be returned to Commander Greater Jakarta Military District, with direct responsibility to Chief of Armed Forces, while Chief of Armed Forces was answerable to President Soeharto.
Going into the first quarter of 1998, the composition of the senior military leadership was changed. General Feisal Tanjung was replaced by General Wiranto as the last Commander of ABRI under the New Order regime (February 1998-October 1999). Other strategic positions, such as Special Forces Commandant General, still under Prabowo Subianto before being transferred to Major General Muchdi Purwoprandjono on March 21, 1998. Prabowo himself was promoted to Lieutenant General as Commander of Armed Forces Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad). The position of Army Chief of Staff was held by General Subagyo HS.
In Jakarta, the operation used the name Mantap Jaya and Mantap Brata Jaya. On August 28, 1998, Commander Greater Jakarta Military District Lt. Gen. Sjafrie and Jakarta Police Chief Hamami Nata would testify to (President BJ Hababie’s) Joint Fact-Finding Team for the 1998 Riots that on the evening of May 14, command was transferred from the Police Chief to the Greater Jakarta Military District Commander. At that time, this position was directly responsible to Chief of Armed Forces Wiranto, not to Commander Strategic Reserve Command Prabowo.
The question arises: why has Prabowo been consistently referred to as the “mastermind” of events around 1998?
Competition for Top Military Leadership
Entering the 1990s, there were rumors of a split within the ABRI officer corps, between the so-called Red and White faction and the so-called Green faction. (Green being a color often associated with Islam.) The Red and White faction consisted of nationalist officers and, to some extent, could be considered secular. This faction was led by General Benny Moerdani (Armed Forces Commander 1983-1988) along with other officers such as General Edi Sudrajat, General (Hon.) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, General (Hon.) Agum Gumelar, Major General Theo Sjafei, and General (Hon.) AM Hendropriyono.
Meanwhile, the Green faction was comprised of officers sympathetic to Islamic groups, particularly the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) led by BJ Habibie. Key generals in this faction included General Feisal Tanjung (Armed Forces Commander 1993-1998), General R. Hartono (Army Chief of Staff 1995-1997), and Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (Greater Jakarta Military District Commander 1997-1998).
However, the sympathy of these officers towards Islamic groups cannot be separated from Prabowo’s role. As revealed by Kivlan Zen in “Conflict and Integration of the Indonesian Armed Forces Army (TNI AD)” (2004), it was Prabowo who approached these officers to garner support for BJ Habibie and ICMI.
Prabowo’s reasoning was to counteract General LB Moerdani’s influence, who was trying to orchestrate a succession, including through a coup against President Soeharto.
Prabowo had once been Moerdani’s special staff in 1983. He reported to President Soeharto about an attempted coup by the Ali Moertopo-trained generals, leading to Moerdani’s anger, and Prabowo’s transfer from the Red Berets (Special Forces Command or Kopassus) to the Green Berets (Strategic Reserve Command or Kostrad).
Prabowo considered Moerdani an obstacle to his military career. When President Soeharto and his family traveled to Mecca in 1991 to performed the Hajj pilgrimage, Prabowo prepared a counter-coup plan in case Moerdani attempted a coup. Moerdani was never proven to have attempted a coup against President Soeharto.
Nevertheless, Prabowo remained anxious. He believed his military career could only progress under President Soeharto’s regime. Prabowo was President Soeharto’s son-in-law, and he had gained the trust of his father-in-law, as mentioned by Kivlan in his book. So Prabowo’s support for BJ Habibie was another way to ensure the safety of his military career.1 [Note-One might wonder whether there is a parallel here with his relationship with the so-called 212 Movement and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in the 2019 elections.]
In the early 1990s, President Soeharto shifted (or pivoted) his political course by sympathizing with Islamic groups and endorsing the establishment of ICMI. BJ Habibie practically became the most likely figure to accompany President Soeharto as vice president in the 1992 elections. In the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) General Session of 1993, Habibie received the highest number of votes from all the MPR factions to become vice president. However, he was replaced due to maneuvers by the (constitutionally appointed) ABRI MPR faction, which proposed General Try Soetrisno.
Nevertheless, Prabowo’s prediction did not entirely miss the mark. President Soeharto continued to trust Habibie, who eventually became vice president in 1998 at the end of the New Order. Prabowo, along with officers from the so-called Green faction, effectively restrained Moerdani’s movement, evident from the prevalence of Green officers in strategic positions from 1990 to 1998, such as General Feisal Tanjung becoming Armed Forces Commander, General R. Hartono becoming Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin becoming Commander Greater Jakarta Military District, and Prabowo becoming Commandant General Special Forces Command. Conversely, the so-called Red and White faction became marginalized.
Megawati as ‘Proxy’
However, this does not mean that General Moerdani and his associates refrained from taking any action. They extended their support to Ms. Megawati Soekarnoputri, who had become an opposition figure during the New Order period.
1993 Surabaya PDI Congress – Megawati Installed as Chairperson
In 1993, before General Edi Sudrajat was sidelined from Armed Forces Commander, the Congress of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was held in Medan, which ended in a deadlock, and was continued at an Extraordinary Congress in Surabaya.
Here the Red and White faction of Armed Forces officers played a role. They supported Megawati to become the Chairperson of PDI. The support was channeled through Armed Forces Social Political Affairs Chief of Staff (Kassospol) Lt. Gen. Haryoto PS and Commandant General Special Forces Command Agum Gumelar.
During an Armed Forces leadership meeting in 1993, Agum openly advised the officers not to think of Ms. Megawati and Mr. Abdurrahman Wahid as enemies. This statement had consequences, and led to Agum’s transfer to Medan as the Chief of Staff of the Bukit Barisan Military District Command.
Salim Said, in “Witnessing 30 Years of Soeharto’s Authoritarian Rule” (2016, pp. 136-137), mentions that, aside from Agum, Hendropriyono was an officer sympathetic to Megawati’s movement at that time. The Red and White group’s operation succeeded. Megawati became the chairperson of PDI at the Surabaya congress.
1996 Medan PDI Congress – Megawati Deposed as Chairperson
However, three years later, the Green faction launched a rival operation. Armed Forces Commander General Feisal Tanjung and Armed Forces Social Political Affairs Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid openly declared their support for the holding of the PDI Congress in Medan in 1996.
With approval from Minister of Home Affairs Lt. Gen. Yogie S. Memet and Director-General of Social Political Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Soetojo NK, the congress took place. Mr. Soerjadi became the chairperson of PDI, according to the government version of events, and obtained legal authority to stand as a participant in the 1997 elections.
The (presidential) succession movement of the Red and White faction generals through Megawati as a ‘proxy’ intersected with the people’s resistance movement from an alliance of pro-democracy groups, including youth from the Democratic People’s Association. (On July 22, 1996, PRD was declared a political party, and in its manifesto stated that, “The New Order can no longer be defended by the people of Indonesia.”)
Operation Mantap (Steadfast)
This (coalescing of opposition) made the Green faction of the Armed Forces fearful. They believed there might be attempts to thwart the 1997 elections and the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) General Session of 1998. Therefore, as a preventive measure under the command of Armed Forces Commander General Feisal Tanjung, Operation Mantap was implemented on March 25, 1996.
Approximately three months later, political violence occurred, known as the “July 27 Riot” or “Kudatuli.” The forced takeover of the PDI office at Jalan Surabaya in Central Jakarta by Mr. Soerjadi’s group resulted in five deaths and 149 injuries, according to the National Commission on Human Rights.
On July 29, 1996, the government named PRD as the mastermind of the so-called Kudatuli riot. President Soeharto even accused PRD of having a “coup mentality” and its manifesto of “thinking and acting like the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)” during a meeting of his Development VI Cabinet on August 7, 1996. (Jawa Pos edition of August 8, 1996)
Nevertheless, in another narrative, there are also indications that the Kudatuli incident was the result of a high-level operation by Lt. Gen. Theo Sjafei, a Moerdani-affiliated group, with a view to elevating Ms. Megawati as a symbol of the resistance against President Soeharto.
Did Elite Military and Political Rivalry Influence the Kidnapping Operation?
In the command structure of the time, based on the analysis outlined by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) investigators in 2005-2006, the highest orders for the 1997-1998 kidnapping and enforced disappearance operations were in the hands of the Commander of ABRI, and the regional operational orders were under the military district commander, held by Major General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin in Jakarta. One of both of their authorities was to issue an Under Operational Control (or BKO) order from Special Forces Command (Kopassus) to specified other units.
An BKO order was issued by the Armed Forces Commander to units at the request of the territorial command, according to Major General Samsuddin, as reported by Kompas on August 29, 1998. Most of the kidnapping operations occurred in Jakarta, including those against five sympathizers of PDI and the United Development Party (PPP) in 1997: Sonny and Yani Afri on April 26; and Deddy Hamdun [PPP], Ismail, and Noval Alkatiri [PPP] on election day, May 29.
Referring to the execution mechanism of Operation Mantap, which concluded on June 30, 1998, the kidnapping victim outside Jakarta, Suyat in Solo, was allegedly held captive first at the Deer Cage, the headquarters of Group 2 Kopassus, before going missing, according to the report of National Human Rights Commission investigators in 2006.
When Suyat, a PRD activist, disappeared on February 13, 1998, from his family’s home, Colonel Slamat Sidabutar served as the Commander of Group 2 at that time.
Meanwhile, Colonel Sriyanto Muntasram served as the Commander of Korem Solo, Colonel Djoko Santoso served as the Commander of Korem Pamungkas Yogyakarta, and Mayjen Mardianto held the position of Pangdam Diponegoro.
Previously, Sriyanto Muntasram was a former Commander of Group 2 Kopassus (1996-1997). A 1974 graduate of the Military Academy, the same cohort as Prabowo, he later served as the Commander of Kopassus (2002-2005); he retired as a major general while serving as the Governor of the Military Academy (2006-2007).
Meanwhile, when Muchdi Purwoprandjono assumed the position of Commander of Kopassus in March 1998, Slamat Sidabutar’s position as the Commander of Group 2 was replaced by Colonel Tisna Komara. Sidabutar was promoted to the position of Commander of Korem in Dili; he died in a helicopter crash in East Timor on June 4, 1998.
As for Djoko Santoso, who later served as the Commander of TNI (2007-2010), he would go on to hold the position of chairman of the election campaign team for Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno in the 2019 presidential election. (“Back then, Mr. Prabowo was the battalion commander, and I was his deputy,” said Djoko Santoso, a member of the Advisory Board of Gerindra Party, while accepting Prabowo’s offer.)
Another indication that the rivalry between the Red and White and Green factions of ABRI influenced the 1998 kidnapping operations is the testimony of surviving victims to the Komnas HAM investigators in 2005-2006. The interrogators at Kopassus Headquarters raised questions about the connections of PRD activists—such as Andi Arief, Faisol Riza, and Raharja Waluyo Jati—with Moerdani, Jusuf Wanandi, and Megawati.
In his testimony, Andi Arief revealed that his kidnapper had claimed, “he was deceived” by Moerdani into engaging in activities against the New Order or, in the kidnapper’s words, “against the state.” Suspicions about PRD activism with conspiratorial allegations, stemming from the rivalry among military elites at the end of Soeharto’s rule, also became the logic of the New Order authorities when investigating the explosion in the Tanah Tinggi apartment complex.
Several documents, books, and a laptop seized from the crime scene were developed by President Soeharto’s security authorities as materials that fueled political speculation, according to Tempo Magazine’s report on May 17, 1999.
Sofjan Wanandi, a businessman and the founder of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), was interrogated by the police and the National Stability Coordinating Agency (Bakostranas) because he was accused of having connections to the Tanah Tinggi explosion—an unfounded accusation.
Prabowo Subianto himself admitted in an interview with Panji Magazine on October 27, 1999, that “the activists… are not experts in making bombs.” This makeshift bomb accidentally exploded because it was triggered by high temperatures.
Wiranto Cuts Prabowo’s Career Trajectory
On March 10, 1998, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) General Session proceeded smoothly and re-elected Soeharto as the president, with BJ Habibie as his vice president. It was a turning point for Prabowo. Two of his close associates ascended to national leadership roles. Eleven days later, Prabowo was awarded a three-star rank on his shoulder, and assumed the position of Commander Armed Forces Strategic Reserve Command (Panglima Kostrad). He was one step away from realizing his dream of achieving a four-star rank and ultimately becoming the Commander of ABRI.
In theory, following the ABRI tradition, Prabowo only needed to wait for Wiranto’s tenure as Armed Forces Commander to end and be replaced by Subagyo HS, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Army (Kepala Staf AD). Then, Prabowo would become the Chief of Staff of the Army (KSAD) and eventually ascend to the position of Armed Forces Commander.
According to Jose Manuel Tesoro of Asiaweek, this process would take at least three years. However, what Prabowo failed to take into account was Wiranto’s agenda. As the Commander of ABRI and a former personal aide to President Soeharto (1987-1991), Wiranto gained strategic advantages and had more room to maneuver in the critical moments leading up to May 21, 1998.
In his autobiography, “Testifying in the Midst of the Storm” (2003), Wiranto admitted that on May 15, 1998, he attended a closed meeting with President Soeharto, Minister of Political and Security Affairs General Feisal Tanjung, Minister of Home Affairs General R. Hartono, Minister for the State Secretariat Saadilah Mursjid, Minister of Justice Muladi, Minister of Information Alwi Dahlan, Head of the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) Moetojib, and Attorney General Soedjono Atmonegoro.
Soeharto convened this meeting to get an update on the latest political situation, especially during his absence in Cairo since May 9 to attend a high-level conference. In the meeting, Wiranto stated that Soeharto wanted to use the MPR Decree No. V/1998, granting special powers to the mandated president to “take special measures due to the worsening national situation.” One of these measures included reactivating the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), a powerful institution that suppressed political views to support Soeharto’s government the 1965 putsch.
Wiranto claimed that Soeharto intended to give him the leadership of Kopkamtib in 1998 as the Minister of Defense and Security (Menhankam)/Pangab. However, before the details of tasks and technical implementation were discussed, Soeharto abruptly ended the meeting.
Prabowo did not enjoy such a luxurious role. On the same day, he picked up President Soeharto from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport, Prabowo received a sour expression from his father-in-law, according to his statement to Tesoro of Asiaweek.
Prabowo suspected that Soeharto’s displeasure towards him stemmed from rumors that he planned to overthrow his father-in-law by deliberately creating unrest. Speaking of the unrest, Prabowo believed that on May 14, 1998, Jakarta was deserted by most senior ABRI officers. At that time, the majority of high-ranking military officers attended a gathering in Malang led by Wiranto, Prabowo told Tesoro.
Meanwhile, the political temperature in Jakarta was already rising following the shooting of four Trisakti University students on May 12. Prabowo claimed that he repeatedly called Wiranto to cancel the gathering, but his requests were denied.
Contrary to Prabowo’s account, Wiranto denied Prabowo’s allegations in his autobiography. Wiranto said that the gathering in Malang was for the handover of the Command of the Rapid Reaction Force. It was not an intentional move to empty Jakarta. He accused Prabowo of asking him to lead the handover, although he did not explain Prabowo’s reasons for the request. On May 18, Soeharto signed Presidential Instruction No. 16 and handed it over to Wiranto on May 20 as the Commander of the National Security Alertness and Safety Operations Command, which was similar to Kopkamtib. One of the orders empowered Wiranto to “take preventive measures… or overcome events that disturb security and order,” including involving civil and military authorities in executing operational commands.
Later, in 2016, Wiranto told Andy F. Noya in the Kick Andy TV talkshow that he did not use that instruction to implement military emergency measures, but followed a peaceful power transition process. Wiranto’s position at that time often brought him to Cendana, the Soeharto family home, especially after May 15, 1998. In his autobiography, Wiranto admitted being at Cendana for various reasons, including on May 17 when he reprimanded Prabowo, who was accused of betraying Soeharto. Prabowo admitted meeting Wiranto at Cendana between May 15-20, 1998, including on May 18 when he received information from Wiranto that Soeharto’s children “wanted to go to war.”
In his memoir, “Decisive Moments” (2006), Habibie mentioned that Wiranto shuttled between Cendana and his own house in Kuningan. On the night of May 20, when Habibie visited Cendana after hearing Soeharto’s resignation plan, Wiranto was there. After a discussion with Soeharto, Habibie asked Wiranto to limit the officers who wanted to meet Soeharto, and to obtain Wiranto’s permission.
Wiranto’s strategic authority was evident when he ordered Greater Jakarta Military District Commander Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin to escort the students’ long march to the parliament on May 18, 1998. The students eventually succeeded in occupying the parliament building after facing obstacles in previous attempts. Wiranto later boasted that his decision to allow the students to occupy the DPR building was to “avoid bloodshed.”
On the other hand, Prabowo’s movements were restricted. In his statement to Tesoro of Asiaweek, he met with two opposition figures, Adnan Buyung Nasution and Abdurrahman Wahid, on May 14 to quell the unrest. On May 16, 1998, he checked the authenticity of a press release from ABRI Headquarters supporting the Islamic Scholars Association (Nahdlatul Ulama) statement calling for Soeharto’s resignation.
At Cendana on May 18, when he met Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, alias Tutut, Soeharto’s eldest daughter, Prabowo presented options to President Soeharto to either replace Wiranto as Armed Forces Commander or implement military emergency measures. However, according to Tutut, Soeharto rejected both options. Prabowo was temporarily assigned by Wiranto on May 19 to secure Amien Rais’s planned demonstration on May 20. “The meeting chaired by Wiranto decided that the order was to prevent the procession by all means,” Prabowo told Tesoro. “I repeatedly asked what it meant. Were we using live bullets? He (Wiranto) did not give a clear answer.”
Later, Prabowo’s actions would contribute to the perception that he orchestrated the unrest. In his autobiography, Wiranto stated that Prabowo’s actions in the field, especially meeting Buyung Nasution and Gus Dur, violated the rules. “Commander Kostrad should be oriented towards the region, tasks, and responsibilities as Commander Kostrad who mobilizes forces under the orders of the Commander of ABRI. Not going here and there to deal with political and state issues. Even if that is done, it must be with the knowledge of the leaders, not on one’s own will and without reporting to superiors,” Wiranto wrote.
Disaster struck Prabowo on the night of May 19, 1998. From Habibie’s house to inform him of the possibility of Soeharto’s resignation, he returned to Cendana hoping for praise for successfully preventing a demonstration. Prabowo saw Wiranto sitting with the Soeharto family. Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih (Mamiek), Soeharto’s youngest daughter, stood up and stared at Prabowo. Then, Mamiek pointed her finger at Prabowo, and said, “You traitor! Don’t set foot in my house again.”
Prabowo left and waited for an explanation, but he only heard his wife Titiek crying. On May 21, 1998, Soeharto resigned. Habibie officially became the president. The next day, Prabowo heard accusations that he had plotted a coup against Habibie. Wiranto conveyed the coup information to Habibie after the inauguration, and was supported by Habibie’s aide, Sintong Panjaitan—Prabowo’s rival in Kopassus.
They claimed that Prabowo mobilized Kostrad and Kopassus troops to the State Palace and Habibie’s residence. The coup rumors infuriated Habibie, who asked Wiranto to remove Prabowo from his position as Commander Kostrad before sunset.
Upon hearing this order, Prabowo tried to seek clarification from Habibie. Prabowo clarified that the mobilization of troops was actually meant to protect Habibie. However, his opinion was ignored by Habibie. On that day itself, Prabowo’s position as Commander Kostrad was revoked—having served for only one month. In the following months after his dismissal, Prabowo’s military career came to a complete end.
Conclusion: Prabowo’s Fall and Political Reunion in Jokowi’s Administration
In August (sic) 1998, Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto issued a decree establishing an Officer Honor Board (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira or DKP) to investigate Prabowo’s involvement in the kidnapping of activists. The Officer Honor Board was chaired by Army Chief of Staff General Subagyo HS, with Deputy Chair Lt. Gen. Fachrul Razi and Lt. Gen. Yusuf Kertanegara, along with six other members, including Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar and Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
The Officer Honor Board decision on August 21, 1998, stated, among other things, that Prabowo—with registration number NRP 27082—had overstepped his authority by ordering the Special Forces Command Rose Team to abduct activists.
He had also failed to report the operation to Wiranto, only doing so in early April 1998 after pressure from Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, head of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency. In conclusion, Prabowo “tended to neglect the operational system, hierarchy, discipline, and law within the Armed Forces environment.” The Officer Honor Board recommended Prabowo’s “dismissal from military service.”
In an interview with Panji Magazine on October 27, 1999, Prabowo claimed he was not surprised by the Board’s decision. He admitted that President Soeharto himself wanted his military career to end, because it was “better for the Armed Forces.”
Prabowo also confessed that his military career was terminated in a meeting with General Moerdani, the general he had most wanted to sideline, shortly before the Officer Honor Board commenced. “So the decision to remove me had been made before the Officer Honor Board was formed,” Prabowo claimed.
Two days after the Board handed down its decision, Prabowo met Wiranto. This 10-minute meeting was tense. Wiranto seemed to wash his hands of the matter, according to Prabowo’s account. “You know the situation,” Wiranto allegedly said. “I don’t like it,” Prabowo reportedly replied, staring into Wiranto’s eyes. On November 20, 1998, President Habibie officially “honorable discharged” Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto from military service.
Later, Prabowo revisited the 1998 coup issue during a speech in the West Java gubernatorial election campaign for the Sudrajat-Ahmad Syaikhu candidates endorsed by a coallition of his Gerindra Party and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). “To be honest,” he said in Depok on April 1, 2018, “in my heart, I regret it. Why didn’t I stage a coup back then?”
Reunion in Jokowi Administration
On Wednesday, just before noon on October 23, 2019, President Joko Widodo and Vice President Ma’ruf Amin introduced their 38 new ministers while sitting in the courtyard of the State Palace.
They were dressed in batik and appeared joyful. Among them were Defense Minister Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Prabowo Subianto (Akmil 1974), Maritime Affairs and Investment Coordinating Minister Gen. (Retd.) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan (Akmil 1970), and Religious Affairs Minister Fachrul Razi (1970). Approximately two months later, President Joko Widodo inaugurated nine members of the President’s Advisory Council, one of whom was Gen. (Retd.) Wiranto (Akmil 1968), the former Minister of Political and Security Affairs in Jokowi’s first administration.
Regarding the lineup of retired generals in Jokowi’s administration, a retired army general we spoke to in early January 2020 expressed surprise given their past competition. He criticized Jokowi’s decision to appoint Prabowo, whom he considered a retired general, as lacking an understanding of the “ethics and norms” of state decisions—referring to the Officer Honor Board’s decision 22 years ago.
“If Prabowo gets a four-star rank—that of a general—it’s like Joko Widodo slapped my right cheek,” he said. He placed his hopes in the generals from the Red and White faction within Joko Widodo’s inner circle that his concerns would not come true, although he doubted it himself. “The competition between Prabowo and Wiranto and Luhut has become something that cannot be denied,” he said. “I’m also surprised that they are now so friendly with Prabowo. But… that’s politics.”
This report was compiled through collaboration between Tirto and military researchers Made Tony Supriatma and Aris Santoso, along with contributors Ahsan Ridhoi, Muammar Fikrie, and the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS). This article is based on the final report of the National Human Rights Commission’s investigative team on October 30, 2006, regarding serious human rights violations in the enforced disappearances of individuals. Other primary source materials include the Officer Honor Board’s decision on August 21, 1998, and President B.J. Habibie’s decision on November 20, 1998. Secondary materials include Prabowo Subianto’s interview with Panji Magazine on October 27, 1999; Prabowo’s admission to Jose Manuel Tesoro of Asiaweek on March 3, 2000; Habibie’s memoir, Wiranto’s autobiography, books written by Kivlan Zen, Salim Said, A. Pambudi on Sintong Panjaitan and Prabowo, and information gathered from the mass media. This fourth report is part of a six-article series to be released over the next week.
This post is based on https://tirto.id/persaingan-para-jenderal-di-balik-kasus-penculikan-kerusuhan-1998-eA2j.
The six PRD abductees:
Aan Rusdianto
Andi Arief
Faisol Riza
- https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/kisah-mugiyanto-korban-penculikan-1998-aku-dihajar-disetrum-diancam-dibunuh-21pzcdLAOMr/3
- https://www.dpr.go.id/blog/profil/id/1698
- https://x.com/keluarga_mk/status/1738889980699627567?s=20
- https://x.com/kresahanhidup/status/1736937737985646747?s=20
- https://x.com/Yaqin120131/status/1735237580625735992?s=20
- https://x.com/NarasiNewsroom/status/1734603492768239759?s=20
Mugiyanto
Nezar Patria
Raharja Waluyo Jati
The Three others:
Desmond J. Mahesa
Haryanto Taslam
Pius Lustrilanang
Indonesian Association of Families of Disappears Persons – Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia (IKOHI)
- https://tirto.id/eks-tim-mawar-jadi-pejabat-kemenhan-ikohi-jokowi-menghina-kami-f5fl
- https://x.com/amnestyindo/status/1185091630056919041?s=20
- https://twitter.com/ikohi
Senasib:
Footnotes:
- Compare his relationship with the so-called 212 Movement and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in run up to the 2019 elections. ↩︎
In related news:
- https://projectmultatuli.org/hardingga-penghilangan-paksa-yani-afri
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/10/14/19264791/tim-mawar-di-jabatan-jabatan-strategis?source=terpopuler
- https://open.substack.com/pub/dropsitenews/p/national-guard-shooter-rahmanullah-lakanwal-afghanistan-zero-units-cia-imprisonment
Stories From Indonesia 
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